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Was Hugh MacColl a logical pluralist or a
logical monist ? A case study in the slow
emergence of metatheorising
Ivor Grattan-Guinness
Middlesex University Business School, London, UK
Résumé : Dans la seconde moitié des années 1900, Bertrand Russell et Hugh
MacColl échangèrent sans s’entendre sur les questions de l’implication et de
l’existence, dans le cadre d’un débat plus général sur la nature de la logique.
Il est tentant de voir dans cet échange une opposition entre le moniste logique
Russell et le pluraliste MacColl. Dans cet article, j’affirme que cette inter-
prétation est inexacte, et que les deux hommes étaient tous deux monistes,
bien qu’ayant des allégeances différentes. La transition du monisme au plura-
lisme ne s’effectue en réalité qu’à partir du début des années 1910, peu après
la mort de MacColl en 1909. Les premiers signes de cette transition sont à
trouver particulièrement chez le philosophe américain C. I. Lewis, le mathé-
maticien néerlandais L. E. J. Brouwer, et le logicien polonais Jan Łukasiewicz.
Ces auteurs sont des exemples de l’avènement graduel de la métalogique.
Abstract: In the mid- and late 1900s Bertrand Russell and Hugh MacColl
had a non-discussion about implication and existence, as parts of a dispute
over the nature of logic. We are tempted to see this debate in terms of log-
ical monist Russell against logical pluralist MacColl, but I argue that this
interpretation is inaccurate; each man was a logical monist, but with different
allegiances. The transition from monism to pluralism began to occur from the
early 1910s onwards, soon after MacColl’s death in 1909; early traces will be
found especially in the American philosopher C. I. Lewis, the Dutch mathe-
matician L.E. J. Brouwer, and the Polish logician Jan Łukasiewicz. They form
examples of the gradual rise of metalogic.
Explicanda
The word ‘logic’ refers here to the theory (or theories) of correct and incor-
rect reasoning, and valid and invalid deductions. ‘Logical monism’ is the claim
that only one theory, L, deserves to be called logic: all other candidate theo-
ries either are misconceived in some way, or are legitimate bodies of knowledge
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but not logic, or are special cases of L. ‘Logical pluralism’ is the stance that
allows for many logics, although the pluralist may prefer some over others.
Both positions are to be understood to be very general, not just, for example,
concerning the difference between a word and its referent. The presence or
absence of symbolism in a logic under consideration is a separate issue.
The history of logic up to the early 20th century shows that logical monism
has usually reigned supreme, with L assigned to some version or other of
classical true-or-false time-independent logic (hereafter, ‘C’), usually involving
predicates and quantification over variables as well as propositions. Examples
include (post-)Boolean algebras, and a mathematical logic including a logic
of relations as practised by Russell. MacColl was a pioneer among logicians
in wishing to break clear from the dominance of C. Some commentators
have seen him as a logical pluralist; they include [Rescher 1974], [Grattan-
Guinness 1998], and [Rahman & Redmond 2008] (who elaborate MacColl’s
logic in an impressive way, and also achieve the no mean feat of supplying a full
bibliography for him). However, I shall argue here that he was a logical monist,
adhering to an L that was wider than C. For recent historical commentary, see
[Cavaliere 1996], further articles in [Astroh & Read 1998], and [Anellis 2009]. 1
I restrict the account to the last five years of MacColl’s life, including the
publication of his logic book [MacColl 1906a] and his discussions with Russell
in the philosophy journal Mind. These included Russell’s review [Russell
1907] of the book there with the reply [MacColl 1907], and notes on existence
([MacColl 1905b; 1905c; 1905d], [Russell 1905]) and on implication ([MacColl
1905a; 1906b; 1908a; 1908b], [Russell 1908]). 2 He and Russell also corre-
sponded quite extensively during the 1900s, and 26 of MacColl’s letters are
preserved in the Russell Archives at McMaster University, Canada [MacColl
1901-1909]. The main points are made several times over in their written
and published exchanges; usually one typical reference is given below. While
Russell was rather dismissive of MacColl to other correspondents, such as Louis
Couturat [Schmid 2001, 499–500] and Philip Jourdain [Grattan-Guinness 1977,
101; 119], at least he kept these letters, which was not always his normal prac-
tice with correspondence at that time (for example, Jourdain’s).
Russell’s classical position
During the period under consideration here Russell was busily working
with A.N. Whitehead on the exposition in Principia Mathematica of their
logicist programme for deriving (some) mathematics from their L = C while
1. Among histories of logic covering that period, the appropriate parts of
[Mangione & Bozzi 1993] and [Grattan-Guinness 2000] are useful for context, but
[Haaparanta 2009] is far too brief.
2. [Russell 1905] and four of MacColl’s pieces are reprinted in [Russell 1973]; one
hopes that in some year or decade Russell’s papers for the period 1906-1908 will
reappear in volume 5 of his Collected Papers.
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avoiding the paradoxes. Part of the preparation was the formalisation of C
itself; Russell reported on progress, especially concerning the propositional
calculus, in a paper on ‘The theory of implication’ published as [Russell 1906].
While he emphasised the role in his theory of the logic of Gottlob Frege, which
he had studied in detail only from 1902, his approach was still dominated by
his chief mentor Giuseppe Peano. In this context the influence was not a
happy one; this paper is the most unclear one by Russell that I have ever
read, on any subject. There are two main reasons: that for Russell logic is an
all-embracing theory, so that there is no “room” anywhere to talk about it, nor
was room sought; and that implication, inference, entailment, consequence,
reasoning and deduction tended to be merged, although at least in [Russell
1908] he used implications between names of propositions.
Russell followed Frege in taking implication and negation as the primitive
connectives, and stressed that the former connective held between propositions
of whichever truth-value: ‘Therefore is distinguished from implies by being
only applicable to implications between true propositions’ [Russell 1906, 165].
One major consequence, which will come under attack from MacColl, stated
that for propositions p and q,
‘p implies q’ is logically equivalent to ‘not-p or q’,
where the disjunction is inclusive. (1)
In fact Russell took (1) in the form of defining ‘p or q’ as ‘not-p implies q’
[Russell 1906, 176]. Here are some further examples of his exegesis.
‘Propositional function’ referred to logical combinations of propositions,
such as (p and p) [Russell 1906, 163]; this use was additional to that of referring
to predicates fx of individual variables x.
The first ‘primitive proposition’, itself a conflation of axiom and rule of
inference, stated that ‘Anything implied by a true proposition is true’ [Russell
1906, 164]. His use of ‘anything’, not ‘any proposition’ was deliberate; for him
‘Aristotle implies Aristotle’, for example, was not badly formed or meaningless,
but false.
Truth-values were “included” in the conception of a proposition; for ex-
ample not-p was expressed by ‘p is not true’ [Russell 1906, 164]. However, ‘p
implies p’ meant ‘for any value of p, p implies p’ [Russell 1906, 163].
The law of excluded middle was ‘p or not-p’; in words, ‘Everything [sic]
is true or not true’ [Russell 1906, 167; 177]. The law of contradiction was
handled similarly [Russell 1906, 178].
No explicit statement of inference was made; for example, the phrase
‘modus ponens’ never appeared. A closely related proposition was:
‘If p is true, then, if p implies q, q is true’. [Russell 1906, 169] (2)
Another candidate is this consequent drawn several pages later, ‘an important
principle of inference, which I shall call the “principle of assertion” ’ [Russell
1906, 180]:
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‘p is true, and if p is true then q is true, then q is true’. (3)
There was plenty here to puzzle the readers (and the audience of Principia
Mathematica from 1910 onwards), although at that time some of these confla-
tions were also committed by other logicians, including by MacColl. However,
his reaction against the status that Russell gave to C was sweeping.
MacColl’s claims
MacColl’s two main points of disagreement concerned existence, and af-
firming or rejecting (1) about implication [MacColl 1908b]; other features that
Russell affirmed and MacColl at least doubted included the need for proposi-
tional functions, relations and quantification in logic, treating a proposition as
a truth-bearer rather than just as a form of words, and the legitimacy of non-
Euclidean geometries ([MacColl 1907, 1901-1909, letters of 26 January 1905,
3 February 1905]). Let us note some main features.
MacColl insisted that propositions should not be classifiable only as true
and false ones but also be divisible into necessary and possible ones. This
brought him into territory that we now recognise as modal logic, and consti-
tutes his principal claim to fame. He wished to restrict implication between
propositions to those that exhibited some semantic or circumstantial connec-
tion; this position also drew him towards relevance logic. In [MacColl 1908a]
he used as an example the propositions:
p := ‘He is a doctor’ and q := ‘He is red-haired’ (4)
and denied that ‘p implies q’ could obtain between them. Russell did not
deny implication, since under the conception of logic that he inherited from
Peano and found backed in this respect by Frege implication satisfied (1) and
so could be asserted between any two well-formed propositions whether or not
they exhibited any connection. In [Russell 1908], he offered to MacColl the
option of asserting that formal implication held between the corresponding
propositional functions by treating ‘he’ as a variable; but this move involved
another point of dissent, since for MacColl ‘he’ was a parameter, and propo-
sitions such as those given in (4) were sometimes true and sometimes false.
He showed no appreciation of quantification over individuals, propositional
functions, relations or propositions, all of which were key to Russell’s logic.
The two propositions in (4) are also examples of MacColl’s fifth category,
‘variable’ propositions, which are possible but uncertain; an example was:
‘Mrs. Brown is not at home’. (5)
He associated this kind of proposition with probability theory [MacColl 1906a,
7], in that one might assess the likelihood of Mrs Brown’s residence at any
given time. It also brought him towards what we now regard as epistemic
logic, for he stressed that such propositions would have a truth value but we
did not know which ([MacColl 1906a, 19] for (5)). For [Russell 1907], (5)
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should be converted to the propositional function ‘Mrs. Brown is not at home
at time x’. Later he defined a propositional function fx to be necessary or
possible according as it is satisfied respectively by all pertinent values of x or
by at least one of them [Russell 1919, 163]; he used modality in a few other
contexts, though always in the confines of C [Dejnozka 1999].
MacColl missed an opportunity to strengthen his case against L = C by
also interpreting (5) as belonging to temporal logic, even though he mentioned
that (5) could be true in the morning and false in the afternoon [MacColl 1907,
470]! Thus he helped to sustain an enormous oversight in the history of the
fight for logics beyond C. To explain, take one frequently encountered context
that C cannot handle: we often make statements about taking sequences of
actions and decisions in some order in time, with ‘and’ meaning ‘and then’.
For example, if I fulfil my promise to the court to tell the truth, the whole
truth and nothing but the truth, and I assert of the plaintiff that ‘he walked
down the stairs and opened the door’, I definitely do not assert that ‘he opened
the door and walked down the stairs’. Now this difference belongs to temporal
logic, which differs from C in not being commutative. The long history of
over-looking temporal logic still has to be recorded; we note here the irony
that MacColl belongs to it. 3
MacColl and Russell also differed on the theory of collections, in that
Russell used Cantorian set theory while MacColl seemed to draw upon tradi-
tional part-whole theory [MacColl 1905d]; the main reason for Russell’s ad-
vocacy of set theory was its central role in logicism, whereas MacColl had
no special plan or place for mathematics in his exposition of logic. Their
disagreements did not hinge upon this difference of aim. More problematic
for Russell, and indeed also for Shearman and every reader, was MacColl’s
handling of classes: for example, misattributing the predicate ‘existent’ as a
class in [MacColl 1905b]. Also unfortunate was his use of ‘0’ to identify the
class of ‘unrealities’, that is, of individuals that do not exist, such as mermaids
([MacColl 1905a] & [MacColl 1906a, 42–43]); for ‘0’ had long been identified
with the empty class (or set). Russell’s reaction is quite reasonable [Russell
1905], though compromised by his own overuse of ‘existence’ as a predicate,
with a variety of senses that sometimes contradict each other: for him an
individual could exist 1) as in existential quantification, or 2) as the refer-
ent of a denoting phrase (an important special case of 1)); and a Cantorian
set could exist as in 3) the existential quantification of sets, or 4) if associa-
ble with a propositional function, or 5) in being non-empty! In particular,
3. On the history of temporal logics see [Øhrstrom & Hasle 2006a] & [Øhrstrom
& Hasle 2006b]. We distinguish temporal logics from the expression within C of
temporal order of events in terms of ordered sets—an exercise of which, curiously,
is pursued in [Russell 1936]. W.V. Quine, a famed logical monist for C, seems to
fail to make the distinction in his treatment of tense in [Quine 1986, 30–31], the
only attention paid to time in this book on the ‘philosophy of logic’. His criticisms
elsewhere of use-mention muddles infecting the understanding of implication are often
justified independently of the issue of monism or pluralism.
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the empty set existed in the first two senses but not in the third [Grattan-
Guinness 1977, 70–74].
Assessments
The exchanges attracted a little attention from others at the time.
Shearman was critical of MacColl, though not very profitably ([Shearman
1906a] & [Shearman 1906b, chap. 5]). Jourdain was judicious in his ap-
praisal of the bearing upon mathematics of MacColl’s contributions to logic,
which MacColl read and accepted shortly before his death in 1909; however,
Jourdain had quoted from Russell much more than from MacColl [Jourdain
1912]. Couturat took Russell’s side in a letter of March 1906 to Peano [Luciano
& Roero 2005, 102–103], who even omitted MacColl from his bibliography of
logicians [Peano 1908, xxiv–xxxvi].
At this distance of time it looks as if MacColl was foraging into various
non-classical logics; but there is a fundamental difference between his and
modern conceptions of such activity. Today logical pluralists see themselves
as shopping around in the various stores of the logics market [Beall & Restall
2005]; but I am sure that MacColl was extending his preferred logic L into
a department store, with one floor occupied especially by modal logic and
other floors by some forms of C, relevance and probability logics. Presumably
he saw the danger that his jumbo logic would be inconsistent, but felt safe
if its constituent sub-logics were kept apart. While in his letters to Russell
he hoped for reconciliation of their views, in his criticisms he did not see
Russell prosecuting a logic different from his own but doing some things wrong
in logic: ‘the whole subject of formal logic needs recasting’ [MacColl 1908b,
454], not supplementing with alternatives to C. He was seeking for replace-
ments within L and additions to it, not attempting to choose between C
and competitor logics.
As they both recognised, the chief difference between the two men lay in
the area of deduction, and rested on the status of modality. The centre of his
department store was the boutique for the necessary and the possible. In the
cases of both ‘implication’ ‘If A then B’ between propositions A and B and
‘inference’ (logical consequence) between them, he saw the conjunction of A
and ‘the denial of B’ as an impossibility, not just as a falsehood as Russell read
it (for example, [MacColl 1906a, 7–8; 80–83]). Such a stance is not pluralism
as we now understand it but a monism, albeit of a scope wider than Russell’s
where there is a pares among which modality is primus. Further, the clarity
of discussion was handicapped on both sides by the absence of a hierarchy of
theories and languages in which the various issues and stances can be sited.
When, then, did logical pluralism emerge, and with whom?
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The emergence of logical pluralism
While MacColl and Russell were disagreeing in the late 1900s, C. I. Lewis
was preparing a doctoral thesis in philosophy at Harvard University under
the direction of Josiah Royce; he completed it in 1910 and soon secured a
post at the University of California at Berkeley. He had taken Royce’s lec-
ture course in logic, and from 1912 he started quickly to produce papers in
the subject, publishing in Mind or in American journals in philosophy. His
chief target was the newly published first volume of Principia Mathematica,
of which Royce had given him a copy; like MacColl he disliked the treatment
there of implication. 4 The opening sentence of his first paper, published in
Mind, referred to ‘two somewhat startling theorems’ in ‘the algebra of logic’, as
he called the traditional approaches based upon C: ‘(1) a false proposition im-
plies any proposition, and (2) a true proposition is implied by any proposition’
[Lewis 1912, 522]. He named as ‘extensional disjunction’ the logically equiva-
lent formulation (1) of implication in terms of negation and disjunction, and
contrasted it with its ‘intensional’ counterpart, for which (1) did not hold; in
order to highlight the difference he named as ‘strict’ the intensional kind [Lewis
1912, 524; 526]. These moves sound like pluralism, but in fact he was monist,
for he made this analogy with geometry: ‘The present calculus of propositions
is untrue in the sense in which non-Euclidian geometry is untrue’ [Lewis 1912,
530], which was not the pluralist understanding of geometries then normally
held by mathematicians. In [Lewis 1913a], he was still more severe about C:
‘Not only does the calculus of implication contain false theorems, but all its
theorems are not proved ’ [Lewis 1913a, 242].
Clearly Lewis was in MacColl territory; presumably he got there indepen-
dently, for only in [Lewis 1913b, 430] did he note MacColl’s work in a short
footnote. Later he mentioned MacColl’s ‘highly complex system’, where for
him ‘the fundamental symbols represent propositional functions rather than
propositions’ [Lewis 1918, 108]; MacColl would not have been pleased.
A new paper for Mind is crucial for our concerns [Lewis 1914b]. Lewis
began by recalling from its predecessor the analogy with Euclidean and non-
Euclidean geometries, in the same monistic spirit. But in the next paragraph
he suddenly went pluralist: ‘The relation of these two [calculi of propositions]
sufficiently resembles that of a Euclidean and a non-Euclidean geometry to
make the analogy worth bearing in mind. Like two geometries, material and
strict implication are equally self-consistent mathematical systems; but they
apply to different worlds’ [Lewis 1914b, 240–241], with the tradition relegated
to non-Euclidean status and preference given to strict implication, which ‘has
a wider range of applications’ [Lewis 1914b, 241]. Thereafter Lewis remained
pluralist; in particular, in his textbook on logic he presented the chapter on
‘the calculus of strict implication’ as concerned with ‘two entirely different
4. Interestingly, Lewis did not question the role of C in logicism in his admiring
review [1914a] of the second volume of Principia Mathematica (1912).
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meanings of “implies” ’ [Lewis 1918, 292]. In his own reminiscence of those
early years as a logician he recalled a reluctant pluralist, although he did make
an analogy with Henri Poincaré choosing a geometry; interestingly, he used
the names ‘ “metalogics” or “pseudo-logics” ’ as synonyms, a known though
infrequent use of the former word [Lewis 1930, 41–43]. 5
Another attack on the dominance of C had been made at this time in
the doctoral thesis of L. E. J. Brouwer [Brouwer 1907]. On rather mysterious
grounds embedded in a metaphysics about the flow of time and the importance
of languagelessness he banned the law of excluded middle from mathematics
and worked his own version of constructive mathematics (and logic), which
he called ‘intuitionism’. In terms of his later definitive position on logic and
mathematics this was an indeterminate position in which, for example, the
infinite numbers of Cantor’s second number-class were admitted but the class
as such not. As his context was quite separate from the concerns of MacColl
and Russell ([van Dalen 1999, chap. 3] & [Hesseling 2003, chap. 2]), the details
need not delay us here; but it is worth noting the coincidence in timing of
another case of logical pluralism—or, perhaps for Brouwer himself in his most
polemical passages, logical monism affirming intuitionistic logic as L.
Very gradually a few non-classical logics began to develop during the 1910s
and the 1920s. Nicolai Vasiliev introduced his ‘imaginary logic’ from 1910,
Brouwer continued with intuitionism in his own eccentric way, Lewis for-
mulated several different modal logics and compared them with each other
from 1912, Jan Łukasiewicz helped to launch many-valued logics from 1917
[Mangione & Bozzi 1993, 465–487]; elsewhere, for example, quantum mechan-
ics was to breed a logic of its own. Opposition was quite vigorous, and for a
very long time; 6 but how could a discussion about logic(s) take place at all?
The ground floor of the home of logics was extending with the construction of
new rooms; but did not this bungalow need an upper storey?
The slow recognition of metalogic
Another feature of young Brouwer’s thesis is the subject of this final sec-
tion: in order to discuss logical monism and pluralism properly we need met-
alogic as a “place” in which we can talk. 7 As we have seen, such mouthroom
5. On Lewis’s logic see [Parry 1968] & [Murphey 2005, chap. 3]; however, neither
author explicitly raises the issue of monism and pluralism. On Lewis’s next stage
concerning possible worlds, see [Sedlar 2009]. In 1920 he came back to Harvard
University, where he had Whitehead as colleague for two decades from 1924; some
aspects of Whitehead’s philosophy influenced him, but they do not seem to have
interacted over logics [Murphey 2005, chaps. 4–7].
6. For a personal witness of the expression of dissent by logical monists over
[Rescher 1974] on MacColl, see [Grattan-Guinness 1998, 11–12].
7. It is not practical to cite all the original sources in this brief survey. The
appropriate parts of [Grattan-Guinness 2000], [Haaparanta 2009] & [Gabbay &Woods
2009] contain much pertinent information and many further references.
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was painfully lacking in both MacColl and Russell, and Lewis did not (yet)
perceive the need for it either. However, Brouwer explicitly formulated ‘math-
ematics of the second order, which consists of the mathematical consideration
of mathematics or of the language of mathematics’ [Brouwer 1907, 61]; the cor-
responding extension of logic is not far away, for his metamathematics itself
was classical.
Brouwer was partly influenced by the first phase of David Hilbert’s pro-
gramme of metamathematics, which lasted from 1898 to around 1905. The
place of metatheorising was actually one of its weaker sides, for he had got his
arithmetic and his logic somewhat intertwined. But the second phase, which
started in 1917, was far more thrusting, and highlighted metathinking about
mathematical theories. Throughout he relied upon C for his logic.
Another important source of metalogic lay in Polish logic. Already in 1913
Łukasiewicz published, in German, a short book on the philosophical founda-
tions of probability theory. Seeking an objective interpretation of probability,
he plumped on the truth-values of propositions determined from a proposi-
tional function (or ‘indefinite proposition’) fx by assigning specific values to
x. The proportion of true judgements that result gave the probability value;
in particular, if only true judgements are obtained, then the indefinite propo-
sition is true; if never, it is false. Thus, as an offshoot of this approach to
probability, a propositional calculus was developed in which truth values of
propositions played a central role, as a ‘calculus of truth-values’ [Łukasiewicz
1913, 16–18; 20–23].
This was a somewhat marginal though nevertheless direct example of the
importance of metalogic for the propositional calculus. In the following years
Łukasiewicz and some other Polish logicians (for example, Stanislav Lesniewski
and Leon Chwistek) became sensitive to metalogic, seemingly via logics them-
selves, through model theory, and/or sorting out syntax from semantics in
natural or formalised languages. The most famous manifestation was to be
Alfred Tarski’s semantic definition of the truth of a proposition of a formal
language in terms of satisfaction in a metalanguage (his term), which was
published in the early 1930s. Tarski lectured in Vienna in February 1930,
and seems to have alerted his friends in the Vienna Circle to the fundamental
importance of metatheory. 8 Thus in 1931 Rudolf Carnap took over the word
‘metalogic’ from the normal meaning that we saw Lewis use at exactly this
time, and referred it instead to the logic of logic, the sense that soon became
customary. Carnap had been motivated by Kurt Gödel’s newly proved first
8. Despite substantial historical literature such as [Wolenski 1989] on the Poles,
[Luschei 1962] on Lesniewski, [Feferman & Feferman 2004] on Tarski, [Stadler 2001]
on the Vienna Circle, and [Szaniawski 1989] & [Wolenski & Köhler 1999] on the links
between the two communities, the histories during the 1920s of their recognitions of
metalogic/theory/language as central concerns are still somewhat obscure; in giving
priority to the Poles I am somewhat influenced by [Menger 1994, chap. 12] and the
letters in [Tarski 1992].
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theorem on the incompletability of first-order arithmetic, where the distinction
between logic and its metalogic plays an essential role.
The absence of Russell from these developments is ironic. We saw above
that the distinction was lacking from his logic; however, when in 1921 he wrote
his introduction to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus he rejected the distinction
made there between showing and saying and proposed instead ‘that every
language has, as Mr. Wittgenstein says, a structure concerning which, in the
language, nothing can be said, but that there may be another language dealing
with the structure of the first language, and having itself a new structure, and
that to this hierarchy of languages there may be no limit’ [Russell 1922, xxii].
This was one of the highlights of his philosophical career; sadly, he did not
notice, and in particular did not apply his insight to perceive the need for a
corresponding hierarchy of logics and their metalogics. So it played no part in
his preparation in 1923 and 1924 of the new material for the second edition
of Principia Mathematica; hence, when the new material appeared in 1925,
the Harvard logician Henry Sheffer justifiably pointed in his review to the
‘logocentric predicament’ that in talking about logic one had to use logic, a
conundrum that he could not resolve [Sheffer 1926]. 9 Similarly, Russell himself
never understood Gödel’s first theorem, always misstating it as applicable to all
mathematical theories and especially thinking that his hierarchy of languages
solved the ‘puzzle’ that he thought it posed rather than being required to
allow the theorem to be stated in the first place. 10 He always remained the
philosopher of one all-embracing logic that he had been in the 1900s when
disagreeing with another logical monist, Hugh MacColl.
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